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Social network services enable users to conveniently share personal information. Often, the information shared concerns
other people, especially other members of the social network service. In such situations, two or more people can have
conflicting privacy preferences; thus, an appropriate sharing policy may not be apparent. We identify such situations as
multiuser privacy scenarios. Current approaches propose finding a sharing policy through preference aggregation. However,
studies suggest that users feel more confident in their decisions regarding sharing when they know the reasons behind each
other’s preferences. The goals of this paper are (1) understanding how people decide the appropriate sharing policy in
multiuser scenarios where arguments are employed, and (2) developing a computational model to predict an appropriate
sharing policy for a given scenario. We report on a study that involved a survey of 988 Amazon MTurk users about a
variety of multiuser scenarios and the optimal sharing policy for each scenario. Our evaluation of the participants’ responses
reveals that contextual factors, user preferences, and arguments influence the optimal sharing policy in a multiuser scenario.
We develop and evaluate an inference model that predicts the optimal sharing policy given the three types of features. We
analyze the predictions of our inference model to uncover potential scenario types that lead to incorrect predictions, and to
enhance our understanding of when multiuser scenarios are more or less prone to dispute.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A social network service (SNS) enables users to maintain social relationships via online interactions.
SNS users share information with each other as they interact. Often, the information shared on an
SNS involves more than one user. A natural example is a picture or video showing a group of
people. Many SNSs enable users to connect the information they upload to other users so that the
connected users can be notified of the uploaded information. Since the information shared varies
depending on the SNS, these connections can take di↵erent forms, e.g., tags on a picture uploaded
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to Instagram or mentions in a tweet. Suppose Alice uploads a picture from last weekend’s party in
which she appears together with her friend Bob, and tags Bob in the picture. When these connections
are created, the other users are linked to the uploaded information. Usually, a connection implies
that the profile of the user can be accessed from the information or some personal information is
shown in conjunction with the uploaded data. Although connections between information and users
are widely employed by SNSs, they can pose a privacy threat. For example, Bob may find that the
picture Alice uploaded is sensitive. However, Bob has no control over uploading that picture, and
Alice’s action can threaten Bob’s privacy by revealing information about him from one setting or
context into another. We identify a situation such as this as a multiuser privacy scenario or, for
brevity, multiuser scenario.
Currently, SNSs do not provide mechanisms to handle multiuser scenarios [Fogue´s et al. 2015].
Thus, a user who did not upload a piece of information concerning him must deal with the privacy
settings chosen by the uploader; at best, the user can remove the connection that links him to the
shared information, but the information itself remains nevertheless. An ideal solution in a multiuser
scenario is to respect each user’s privacy. However, often such a solution may not be viable since
the preferences of the users involved may conflict. For example, suppose Alice would like to share
a picture in which Bob and she appear along with her friend Charlie. However, Bob would like to
share this picture only with his common friends and he does not know Charlie. Here, no solution
completely respects both Alice’s and Bob’s preferences.
Several researchers, e.g., [Besmer and Lipford 2010; Lampinen et al. 2011; Wisniewski et al.
2012; Such et al. 2014], have identified the lack of decision-support systems that help users resolve
multiuser privacy conflicts as one of the biggest gaps in privacy management in social media. The
main challenge that such decision-support systems would address is proposing an optimal solution:
a solution most likely to be accepted by all those involved in the multiuser scenario. Although an
optimal solution may not exist for each multiuser scenario, identifying one, when it exists, can
minimize the burden on the users of having to resolve the conflict manually.
Other researchers (see [Squicciarini et al. 2009; Carminati and Ferrari 2011; Hu et al. 2013; Such
and Criado 2016]) have proposed methods to automatically determine solutions to conflicts based
on users’ privacy preferences. These methods su↵er from two main limitations. One, either they ag-
gregate preferences in the same way regardless of the context or consider only a few, predetermined
situations among the large number of potential situations. Two, they do not consider the reasons
behind users’ preferences. However, evidence from self-reported data [Lampinen et al. 2011; Wis-
niewski et al. 2012] suggests that users entertain the explanations provided by others and that the
optimal solution may depend upon the particular context and reasons behind users’ preferences.
Following this idea, we empirically study three types of factors that potentially influence a privacy
decision: the scenario’s context, users’ preferences, and their arguments about those preferences. An
argument is a justification a user employs to convince the others involved that the user’s expectations
are reasonable and should be taken into account for making a decision.
Our key objective in this paper is to build an argumentation-based model that accurately repre-
sents a multiuser scenario. To this end, we (1) identify important factors that potentially influence
the inference of sharing decisions; (2) evaluate the relative importance of these factors in inferring
an optimal solution; and (3) develop a computational model that predicts an optimal solution for a
given multiuser scenario.
We design a study where human participants are asked to choose what they think is the most
appropriate sharing policy in a multiuser scenario we specified. Combining di↵erent values of the
three types of factors we identified (context, preferences, and arguments), we generate 2,160 sce-
narios. Considering the sheer number of participants required, we conducted our study on Amazon
Mechanical Turk (MTurk), collecting responses from 988 unique MTurk participants.
We are interested in understanding the norms of information sharing similar to those described
by Nissenbaum [2004], Criado and Such [2015], and Murukannaiah et al. [2016] for multiuser
scenarios. Therefore, our methodology crowdsources participants’ opinions about what informa-
tion sharing policies are optimal for a number of hypothetical scenarios involving third parties.
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Shvartzshnaider et al. [2016] employ an approach similar to ours, where they crowdsource infor-
mation sharing norms for an educational context generating hypothetical scenarios involving third
parties. We later on show, however, that some scenarios lead to discrepancies in participants opinions
and personalisation is the key to accurately recommending sharing policies for multiuser scenarios.
Contributions
(1) We propose a novel model for representing and reasoning about multiuser scenarios, employing
three types of features: contextual factors, user preferences, and user arguments.
(2) We build a classifier, based on machine learning, as an exploratory attempt to predict the opti-
mal sharing policy and evaluate the underlying privacy complexity of multiuser scenarios.
(3) Employing the results obtained by the classifier, we identify what combinations of scenario-
defining elements introduce variability in judgments on optimal sharing policy.
Organization
Section 2 identifies factors potentially influencing a multiuser sharing decision. Section 3 describes
an inference model for predicting the optimal sharing policy and the MTurk study we conducted
to build a dataset for training and testing our inference model. Section 4 describes our hypotheses
and evaluation strategy. Section 5 presents our results and Section 6 describes how some of those
results can be employed in a practical tool. Section 7 discusses our results, threats to their validity,
and pointers for future work. Section 8 describes related works and Section 9 provides conclusions.
2. FACTORS INFLUENCING A MULTIUSER SHARING DECISION
We identify three important classes of factors that potentially influence the privacy decision in a
multiuser scenario: context, user preferences, and arguments by users.
2.1. Context
Our definition of context reflects intuitions compatible with those of Nissenbaum’s [2004] study of
social settings that dictate the flow of personal information. Her definition of contextual integrity
captures the idea that people share information of varying type and sensitivity in society, not simply
as individuals in an undi↵erentiated social world, but as individuals in certain capacities (roles), in
distinctive social contexts, such as health care, education, and employment. Since Nissenbaum for-
mulates contextual integrity in the field of law and public policy, legal elements, such as obligation
or entitlement, are prominent in the existing account. However, we posit that the legal elements do
not adequately cover several aspects of sharing decisions in social networks.
Based on the literature, we focus on three elements of context as factors influencing sharing
decisions in multiuser scenarios.
Relationships among the individuals. The roles of the individuals involved in a transaction are a
defining element of context. Also, the relationship type is crucial when making individual deci-
sions about privacy in social media [Marwick and Boyd 2011; Kairam et al. 2012]. Specifically,
people share information di↵erently with friends, family, and colleagues. We hypothesize that
relationship types influence how a person perceives a multiuser scenario, because attributes of a
relationship such as intimacy may influence the extent to which the parties involved in the sce-
nario respect each other’s opinion. For example, following Wisniewski et al. [2012], we imagine
that a user’s friend would respect the user’s preferences.
Sensitivity of the information. The sensitivity of the information to be shared is known to influence
individual sharing decisions in social media [Wang et al. 2011; Sleeper et al. 2013]. Besides,
the judgment of appropriateness of sharing any information on an SNS is user and culture spe-
cific. For example, in some cultures, drinking alcohol is taboo. Thus, a picture showing a person
drinking can be inappropriate in one culture, but normal in another. Each individual involved in
a scenario has a perception of the sensitivity of the information. This perception may a↵ect how
important that person thinks his or her view is on the appropriate sharing decision.
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Sentiment associated with the information. A user may employ social media for self-presentation
and sharing as a means of maintaining that presentation [Hogan 2010; Kairam et al. 2012]. The
sentiment conveyed by the personal information a user discloses on social media influences his
or her self-presentation. For example, a user may share a picture of his recently broken leg with
friends to receive emotional support. Similarly, a user can publicly post a picture of his graduation
to obtain public recognition from everyone and congratulations from friends and family. In these
examples, both pictures convey extremely di↵erent sentiments, nonetheless, both can be worth
sharing, although with di↵erent audiences, depending on the intentions of the users. Since one
of our goals is to observe the influence of arguments (which may convey the intentions of users)
on the final privacy decision, we include sentiment as a factor contributing to context. Further,
recent research on social media [Siersdorfer et al. 2010; You et al. 2015] presents methods to
classify pictures based on sentiment, and some studies [Stieglitz and Dang-Xuan 2013] tackle the
influence of the sentiment of the information on the level of its disclosure.
2.2. Preferences
The goal of each individual in a multiuser scenario is to persuade the sharer to apply the individual’s
preferred sharing policy to the information in question. The individuals’ (including sharer’s) prefer-
ences may be either compatible or conflicting. For example, Bob’s preference of “I do not want my
parents to see this picture” is compatible with Alice’s preference of “I want only my friends to see
it,” as long as Bob’s parents are not among Alice’s friends. Optimally, the final decision to resolve
a conflict should respect the preferences of every individual involved to the best possible extent. If
all preferences are compatible with each other, the solution is trivial. However, in case of conflict,
an acceptable solution may not be evident.
A sharing policy can imply no sharing, sharing publicly, or anything in between. Further, depend-
ing on the number of contacts and their types, sharing policies change from one SNS user to another.
Given the large space of possibilities, for the sake of simplicity, we limit the sharing policies in our
setting to three levels of disclosure.
(1) Share with all: Anyone on the SNS can access the information. This sharing preference is at
one end of the spectrum of sharing preferences.
(2) Share among themselves: Only the individuals directly connected with the information can ac-
cess the information. Since the scenarios presented in our study always include a number of
individuals who are willing members of a group picture, the case of sharing among themselves
equals the case of no sharing. That is, it does not matter whether the picture is shared among
themselves on the SNS, because they shared the moment when the picture was taken, and shar-
ing the moment can be more meaningful than sharing it online. Consequently, this preference
is the direct opposite of share with all. Thus, we place it at the other end of the spectrum.
(3) Share with common friends: Only common friends of the individuals involved in the scenario
can access the information. As explained before, the space of possibilities is large and varies
from user to user. Thus, there are no predefined privacy preferences that cover every possibil-
ity. Nonetheless, we consider that share with common friends is a reasonable compromise to
present a privacy preference that lies in between the two ends of the spectrum represented by
the preceding two preferences.
Two of the above sharing policies (share with all and share among themselves) represent the two
ends of the spectrum of sharing possibilities and the other option is in between. We note that the
sharing preferences Facebook employs in its basic privacy configuration are only me, friends, and
public. The three sharing preferences we consider are the same ones Facebook employs, though
adapted to sharing in multiuser scenarios. A benefit of choosing settings similar to Facebook, a
popular SNS, is that many participants would be familiar with these privacy settings and would
understand their privacy implications.
In addition to the three options above, we considered share with all friends of all the parties as
a sharing preference to include in our study. First, we note that including an additional preference
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would increase the total of number of scenarios to investigate. Second, a typical SNS user has a
large number of friends (e.g., a recent study of two large samples of Facebook users found the mean
values of a user’s friends in the two samples to be 155.2 and 182.8 [Dunbar 2016]). As a result,
sharing with all friends of all three parties involved is likely to include many strangers from each
party’s perspective. Thus, we concluded that, from a user’s perspective, the risk-benefit tradeo↵ of
share with all friends of all the parties may be similar to share with all. Consequently, we decided
not to include sharing with all friends of all the parties as an additional preference.
2.3. Arguments
An individual involved in a multiuser scenario may employ arguments to persuade the others that
his preferred sharing policy should be used, or at least considered for making the final decision.
There are potentially many arguments one can employ to negotiate with or persuade another person.
Following Walton et al. [2008], we understand arguments as instances of argumentation schemes,
each scheme representing a form of inference from premises to a conclusion. Walton et al. show
that arguments used in everyday conversation fall into a small number of schemes.
We identify four argumentation schemes that can be e↵ective in deciding an optimal solution for a
multiuser scenario: argument from (i) good consequences, (ii) bad consequences, (iii) an exceptional
case, and (iv) popular opinion. It is important to note that we neither claim the foregoing as the only
possible argumentation schemes applicable in resolving a multiuser privacy conflict nor do we seek
to evaluate if these are the best possible schemes. Our objective is to evaluate if arguments, as
instances of argumentation schemes, help in deciding the final policy in multiuser scenarios. Our
motivation in adopting argumentation schemes is to restrict the arguments to be of a few well-
defined types, instead of choosing the arguments arbitrarily.
The general structure and examples for the argumentation schemes we use is as follows.
Argument from good consequences. If A is brought about, then good consequences will occur.
Therefore, A should be brought about.
An example of an argument from good consequences is: We had a lot of fun during the party.
Everybody’s talking about how funny you were and they want to see your pictures. Let’s share this
picture with everybody. An SNS user, who shares something, expects to receive some benefit, e.g.,
friendship, jobs, or other social opportunities [Ellison et al. 2007]. Thus, it is reasonable to argue
that sharing certain information implies a good consequence.
Argument from bad consequences. If A is brought about, then bad consequences will occur. There-
fore, A should not be brought about.
An example argument for bad consequences is: It’s a funny picture, but embarrassing since I
appear drunk. I don’t want strangers seeing it. Sharing inappropriate information can hurt people’s
feelings and cause social tension. Thus, negative consequences can be valid arguments for not shar-
ing.
Argument from an exceptional case. If this case is an exception, then the established rule can be
waived in this case.
An example of an argument from an exceptional case is: C’mon! it was our graduation party!
something that we do only once in our lifetimes. We should show it to the world. Although prior
experience can guide future decisions, handling exceptions calls for a di↵erent approach. Instances
of this scheme cover cases where an unusual privacy configuration may be called for: potentially, the
opposite of the policy that might have been adopted if the arguments were not provided. Obviously,
an individual must make a strong case to justify that the information is exceptional.
Argument from popular opinion. If a large majority (of the relevant group G) accepts a claim, then
there is a presumption in favor of that claim. Similarly, if a large majority rejects a claim, then
there is a presumption against that claim.
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We do not consider explicit arguments from popular opinion. That is, in our setting, no user
involved in a scenario provides an argument such as: “the majority of us wants to share this picture
only with common friends, hence, we should share it only with common friends.” Instead, the
popular opinion emergeswhen two or more users suggest the same sharing policy. Thus, although no
individual explicitly employs an argument from popular opinion, the preferences of the individuals
involved in a scenario may imply a popular opinion.
3. INFERENCE MODEL
We envision a computational model that incorporates the factors identified in Section 2 to recom-
mend an optimal sharing policy for a multiuser scenario. Figure 1 shows an overview of the model.
Information 
to be Shared
User
Sharing 
Context
Preferred 
Policy
Argument
concerns Optimal 
Sharing Policy
Policy 
RecommenderContextual features
Preference-
based features
Argument-
based features
Classifier
Training Set
learns from
predicts
Fig. 1. An overview of our envisioned inference model that predicts optimal sharing policy in a multiuser scenario
Given a piece of information to be shared in a multiuser scenario, we first identify all users
involved in the scenario. This can be accomplished, for example, by enabling a tagging mechanism.
We then ask each user identified to provide his or her preferred sharing policy for the information
and an argument justifying that preference. As for the sharing context: (1) relationships can be
obtained directly from the SNS; (2) users can be asked to rate the sensitivity of the information; and
(3) several automated approaches exist for computing the sentiment of the information.
We note that all information above may not be available in a multiuser scenario. For example,
some of the individuals involved in a multiuser scenario may not specify their preferences or ar-
guments. Thus, we envision an inference model recommends a sharing policy based on available
information and improves the recommendation as more information becomes available.
The core of our model is a policy recommender, which employs a machine learned classifier to
recommend an optimal sharing policy for a given scenario. The recommender can employ a tradi-
tional classifier. However, two important challenges are (1) to engineer the features of the classifier
based on the sharing context, and the preferences and arguments of the users involved, and (2) to
build a dataset to train and test the classifier.
Next, we describe a crowdsourcing approach to build a dataset for training the policy recom-
mender. This approach is useful not only for testing the recommender, but also for building a seed
training set required for practical deployment of the recommender. Once the recommender is in use,
additional instances can be added to the training set during deployment—as users share information
via the model by adopting (or disregarding) the recommender’s suggestions.
3.1. Data Collection via Crowdsourcing
The dataset we seek must consist of a variety of multiuser scenarios and the optimal sharing policy
in each of those scenarios. We expect that, in a multiuser scenario, one party’s preferred sharing
policy will rarely be the sharing policy all the users involved adopt. Therefore, to collect actual first-
party data, we would need to recruit cliques of participants that already know each other and ask
them to recreate multiuser scenarios. This is nontrivial and challenging. Users are often reluctant to
share sensitive information (one of the contextual factors in our model), biasing the study toward
nonsensitive cases that users are willing to reveal [Wang et al. 2011]. An alternative is asking users
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to self-report how they behave when they experience a multiuser scenario, but the results may not
match participants’ actual behavior because of the well-known dichotomy between users’ stated
privacy attitudes and their actual behavior [Acquisti and Gross 2006].
Considering the challenges above, we chose to create situations in which participants are im-
mersed [Mancini et al. 2010] to improve behavior elicitation while avoiding biasing the study to
nonsensitive situations. We present information about two or more individuals in a specific circum-
stance: a combination of context, preferences, and arguments. We ask participants to choose an
optimal sharing policy for that circumstance.
An approach similar to ours is to ask participants to imagine themselves as involved in the pre-
sented situation. For example, showing a picture of some people and telling the participant that the
picture depicts him or her with some friends. We chose against this approach for two reasons. First,
participants may feel awkward imagining themselves in the presented situation (e.g., they may feel
“that is silly, I would never do that!”), resulting in participants not immersing themselves e↵ectively
in the situation. Second, we have multiple users in each scenario and the optimal policy may depend
on the particular user’s role we ask the participant to play. This will require us to collect data from
the perspective of each user involved in a scenario, increasing the number of scenarios to collect
data from three fold.
We recruited participants for our study from Amazon MTurk [Paolacci et al. 2010]. We directed
each participant to an external website that asked the participant to complete seven survey instru-
ments: a presurvey questionnaire about demographics, five picture surveys (each involving a privacy
conflict scenario and three sets of questionnaires), and a post-survey questionnaire about the partic-
ipant’s general opinions about resolving multiuser privacy conflicts. The study was approved by the
IRB at North Carolina State University (details about participants and rewards are in Section 3.1.4).
3.1.1. Presurvey Questionnaire. We asked participants to report their age, gender, level of educa-
tion, how frequently they use social media, and how often they share (multiuser) pictures online.
Since some of the situations we presented to the participants could be inappropriate for young
readers, we required participants to be older than 18 years of age and showed a disclaimer at the
beginning that the survey may be inappropriate for some users.
3.1.2. Picture Survey. The picture survey is the core of our study. We first show a picture and
describe a hypothetical scenario in which the picture was taken and next ask a series of questions.
Table I shows two examples of picture survey. We generated these and several similar picture sur-
veys by combining factors identified in Section 2, as described below.
(1) Regarding context variables, we consider a predefined set of relation types, namely, friends,
family, and colleagues. Squicciarini et al. [2011] and Toch et al. [2012] employ the same three
types as an approximation to a user’s relationships on a social network. Further, we assume that
all individuals involved in a scenario have the same type of relationship with each other (i.e.,
all of them are either friends, family, or colleagues). Also, the pictures shown in the situations
could be sensitive or nonsensitive and convey either a positive or a negative sentiment. This
leads to 12 possible contexts. We found a representative picture for each of those combinations.
Although we selected these 12 representative pictures, it is important to note that we ask partic-
ipants to identify the contextual factors for each picture shown to them as indicated in Table I.
Specifically, we ask participants to identify the type of relationship among the people involved
in the scenario (family, colleagues, or friends), and rate sensitivity (Likert scale 1 = not sen-
sitive at all, 5 = very sensitive), sentiment (1 = extremely positive, 5 = extremely negative).
Appendix A includes all the 12 pictures we employed in our study along with participants’
ratings of contextual factors for those pictures.
(2) We assume that (1) an argument from bad consequence does not often support a share with
all policy, and (2) an argument from good consequence does not often support a share among
themselves policy. Although such combinations are conceivable, e.g., in scenarios where one
of the users involved wishes a negative outcome for another, we posit that such scenarios are
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Table I. Two example picture surveys (shortened version of those we used)
Picture
Description Aiko (C) took the picture above with her col-
leagues Ichiro and Katsu and, a French volun-
teer at the tsunami relief center
Three friends, Mark, Alex, and John, took the
picture above during Mark’s bachelor party on
a boat in Ibiza
Rating Identify the relationship between Aiko, Ichiro,
and Katsu and rate the sensitivity and senti-
ment of the picture
Identify the relationship between Mark, Alex,
and John and rate the sensitivity and sentiment
of the picture
Context Consider that Aiko wants to upload this pic-
ture to her social media account. What sharing
policy should she apply for the picture?
Consider that Alex wants to upload this pic-
ture to his social media account. What sharing
policy should he apply for the picture?
Preferences Next, consider users’ preferences as follows
Aiko. Share among ourselves
Ichiro. Share among ourselves
Katsu. Share with all
Considering the context and users’ prefer-
ences, what sharing policy should Aiko apply
for the picture?
Next, consider users’ preferences as follows
Mark. Share among ourselves
Alex. Share with common friends
John. Share with all
Considering the context and users’ prefer-
ences, what sharing policy should Alex apply
for the picture?
Arguments Finally, consider the users’ preferences and ar-
guments as follows
Aiko. This was one of the worst natural disas-
ters ever. Share among ourselves
Ichiro. Tsunami was a disaster and our hand
gestures are not appropriate; people may get
the wrong idea. Share among ourselves
Katsu. The picture shows the di cult situa-
tion of survivors; sharing this picture can
encourage people to help. Share with all
Considering the context, and users’ prefer-
ences and arguments, what sharing policy
should Aiko apply for the picture?
Finally, consider the users’ preferences and ar-
guments as follows
Mark. There were some girls at the party;
people might understand things the wrong
way. Share among ourselves
Alex. This was one of the best day of our lives.
Share with common friends
John. The is not like any other picture; it was
from Mark’s bachelor party! Share with all
Considering the context, and users’ prefer-
ences and arguments, what sharing policy
should Alex apply for the picture?
not common in real life. We exclude these combinations for simplicity. Further, we restrict the
argument from exceptional case to support only policies at either extreme: share with all or
share among themselves. Thus, we consider six policy-argument combinations.
(3) We limit the number of individuals involved in each scenario to three. This way, the implicit
argument from popular opinion could work (when applied) without ties. Although some sce-
narios we employed showed pictures with more than three individuals, our scenarios discussed
the preferences and arguments of only three of the individuals among the people involved with
the picture.
(4) We make sure that not all three individuals in a scenario use the same policy-argument combi-
nation. Our objective is to understand how a user decides a final policy given the scenario, and
the preferences and arguments of others in the scenario. If all users thought the same way and
wanted the same result, the solution would be trivial.
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Putting the above together, we have: 12 pictures based on context, six policy-argument combi-
nations each of first two individuals can employ, and five policy-argument combinations the last
individual can employ (last restriction above). That is, we generated 2,160 scenarios. Each MTurk
participant was shown five unique scenarios, making sure that no participant was shown the same
picture twice. Scenarios were shown in random order to counter ordering bias. Further, we asked
participants to immerse themselves in the particular scenario and ignore the resemblance or lack of
resemblance of each scenario to other scenarios in which they might have seen that picture.
Following the picture and its description, we asked participants to identify the contextual factors
for the scenario and answer three sets of questionnaires. We asked participants to answer these ques-
tionnaires sequentially and when answering a questionnaire, to consider only information provided
to them up to that point.
Each of the three questionnaires tells participants that one of the individuals in the scenario wants
to upload the picture to a social media account and asks participants what sharing policy should
be applied. The participants choose one of the policies from share with all, share with common
friends, and share among themselves. In the first questionnaire, participants know only the contex-
tual attributes, but not the preferences or arguments of the individuals in the scenario. This case is
similar to a real scenario where a user wants to upload and share information without asking others
potentially concerned with the information. The second questionnaire introduces the preferences of
all the users, but without their arguments supporting preferences. The third questionnaire employs
all of the elements: the individuals in the scenario expose their preferences and support them with
arguments. We keep the preferences fixed from the second questionnaire to the third, so we can
observe the e↵ect arguments have on the final decision.
3.1.3. Post-Survey Questionnaire. The post-survey questionnaire asks the following questions.
(1) How important do you think the following factors are in choosing an appropriate policy when
sharing information concerning multiple users on social media? (a) Relationship between stake-
holders; (b) Sensitivity of the information shared; and (c) Sentiment of the information shared.
The response to each factor was on a Likert scale (1 = not important at all, 5 = extremely
important).
(2) How confident will you be in choosing an appropriate policy for sharing information concern-
ing multiple users on social media in the following cases? (a) You do not know the users’
preferences or arguments; (b) You know the users’ preferences, but not their arguments; and
(c) You know the users’ preferences and arguments. The response to each case was on a Likert
scale (1 = not confident at all, 5 = extremely confident).
Responses to the above questions enable us to find correlations (or lack thereof) between partici-
pants’ self-reported behavior and what they actually answered during the study.
3.1.4. Participants and Quality Control. We needed 432 participants to receive one response per
scenario (each participant responds to five of the 2,160 scenarios described above). We intended to
obtain two responses per scenario for completeness. However, we anticipated that some participants
would begin a survey but not finish it, leaving gaps in the completed responses. To address this
challenge, we launched the study on MTurk in multiple batches. For each batch, we checked if a
particular survey needed additional responses and restricted the posted tasks accordingly. The final
number of unique participants that completed the study was 988. At the end, each scenario had
received at least two responses and some had received three responses. Compensation was provided
for only those who completed all seven steps in the survey.
For quality control, we required participants to have completed at least 50 tasks on MTurk and to
have had a success rate of at least 90% [Peer et al. 2014]. We included an attention check question
[Gadiraju et al. 2015] in the ratings section of each picture survey, asking how many people (faces)
were present in the picture, answering which requires counting from the picture. Participants an-
swered the attention question incorrectly in a total of 38 instances (less than 1% of responses). If a
participant incorrectly answered the attention check question in a picture survey, we excluded that
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picture survey from analysis, and retained only those picture surveys where the participant answered
the attention check questions correctly.
Table II. Demographics of MTurk participants of our study
Gender Male: 46.3%, Female: 53.4%, Other: 0.3%
Age 18–20: 2%, 21–29: 36.6%, 30–39: 36%, 40–49: 13.7%, 50–59: 7.5%, 60 or more: 4.1%
Education Graduate degree: 11.2%, Bachelor degree: 44.4%, College no degree: 30.9%,
High school: 12.4%, Less than high school: 1%
Social media usage Daily: 83.9%, Weekly: 12%, Monthly: 3.7%, Never: 0.4%
Pictures shared Many (>5): 35.1%, Few (1–5): 45%, None: 18.1%, Not sure: 1.7%
Conflicts experienced Many (>5): 2.8%, Few (1–5): 30.1%, None: 66%, Not sure: 1.1%
Table II summarizes our participants’ responses to the presurvey questionnaire. The question
corresponding to the last row in the table was in the post-survey questionnaire, so that participants
understand what multiuser conflicts look like before answering that question. As shown, the majority
of our participants used social media on a daily basis. Over 80% of our participants had shared a
picture showing multiple users and about one-third of them had experienced privacy conflicts.
3.2. Building a Training Set
We map the data collected in the MTurk study to a training set the policy recommender learns from.
A training set consists of a set of data instances, where each data instance consists of a response
variable (class) and a set of predictors (features). We set these as follows.
— A data instance corresponds to a participant’s response to a picture survey.
— The response variable is the final policy chosen by the participant.
— The predictors are divided into three cases based on the picture survey. The first case consists of
contextual features; the second case consists of contextual and preference-based features; and the
third case consists of contextual, preference-based, and argument-based features. For brevity, we
refer to these cases as Context, Preferences, and Arguments, respectively.
3.2.1. Contextual Features. We compute the contextual features based on participants’ responses
in the ratings section of the picture survey.
(1) Sensitivity and sentiment each yield a feature with five levels corresponding to integer ratings
from 1 to 5.
(2) Relationship yields a feature with three levels: family, friendship, and colleagues.
3.2.2. Preference-Based Features. We compute the following features based on the preferences
portrayed in the corresponding scenario (picture survey). For concreteness, we base our examples
on Table I (left).
(1) Preference counts represents three features corresponding to the number of participants prefer-
ring each of the three policies. In Table I (left), the preference counts are: share with all is 1,
share with common friends is 0, and share among themselves is 2.
(2) Most and least restrictive policies represent, among the preferred policies of the users in a
scenario, the policy restricting sharing of information the most and the least, respectively. The
order of policies from least to most restrictive is: share with all, share with common friends, and
share among themselves. In Table I (left), the most restrictive policy is share among themselves,
and least restrictive policy is share with all.
(3) Majority policy represents the policy preferred by the majority of the users involved in the
scenario. This feature can be null if there is no majority. The majority policy in Table I (left) is
share among themselves.
ACM Transactions on Computer-Human Interaction, Vol. X, No. X, Article X, Publication date: January 2016.
Multiuser Privacy Scenarios: Context, Preferences, and Arguments X:11
3.2.3. Argument-Based Features. We compute argument-based features from the arguments users
involved in a multiuser scenario provide for their corresponding preferences (also, recall from Sec-
tion 2.3 that we restrict arguments to be instances of one of the argumentation schemes we consider).
(1) Argument counts represent the number of times each type of argument is employed in the
scenario. For Table I (left), the counts are: argument from an exceptional case supporting share
among themselves is 1 (Aiko’s), argument from negative consequence supporting share among
themselves is 1 (Ichiro’s), argument from positive consequence supporting share with all is
1 (Katsu’s), and each of the remaining three argument-policy combinations is 0 (recall from
Section 3.1.2 that there are six argument-policy combinations).
(2) Arguments supporting least restrictive policy are the types of arguments that support the least
restrictive policy. For Table I (left), the argument supporting least restrictive policy is argument
from positive consequence supporting share with all.
(3) Arguments supporting most restrictive policy are the types of arguments that support the most
restrictive policy. For Table I (left), these are argument from positive consequence and argument
from an exceptional case both supporting share among themselves.
(4) Arguments supporting majority policy are the types of arguments that support the policy pre-
ferred by the majority of users. For Table I (left), these are argument from positive consequence
and argument from an exceptional case both supporting share among themselves.
When arguments from distinct schemes support a policy, as in the arguments supporting least
restrictive policy and majority policy cases above, we employ the combination of arguments as a
distinct feature value. Also, if a majority policy does not exist, we set the corresponding argument-
based feature to null.
4. EVALUATION
In this section, we describe our hypotheses and the techniques we use to evaluate those hypotheses.
4.1. Hypotheses
(1) H-Influence-Context: Contextual factors, specifically, sensitivity and sentiment of the informa-
tion shared, and the relationships among individuals involved influence the choice of optimal
sharing policy in a multiuser scenario.
(2) H-Influence-Preferences: Preferences of users involved in a multiuser scenario influence the
choice of optimal policy for the scenario.
(3) H-Influence-Arguments: Users’ arguments for their preferred sharing policies influence the
choice of optimal policy in a multiuser scenario.
(4) H-Prediction-Preferences: Adding preferences to the contextual factors enhances the accuracy
of an inference model predicting the optimal policy for a given multiuser scenario.
(5) H-Prediction-Arguments: Adding arguments to preferences and contextual factors enhances the
accuracy of an inference model predicting the optimal policy for a given multiuser scenario.
(6) H-Confidence-Preferences: Adding preferences to the contextual factors enhances a user’s con-
fidence in choosing the optimal policy for a given multiuser scenario.
(7) H-Confidence-Arguments: Adding arguments to preferences and contextual factors enhances a
user’s confidence in choosing the optimal policy for a given multiuser scenario.
4.2. Evaluation Strategy
4.2.1. H-Influence-⇤. To evaluate our hypotheses about influences of di↵erent factors, we build
multinomial logistic regression models (multiple predictors and one response variable). We adopt
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) as a measure of goodness of fit for these models.
AIC = 2k   2 ln L, (1)
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where L is the maximum value of the likelihood function for the model, and k the number of esti-
mated parameters in the model. Lower values of AIC indicate better fit. AIC rewards goodness of
fit (as assessed by the likelihood function), but includes a penalty that is an increasing function of
the number of estimated parameters. The penalty discourages overfitting—increasing the number of
parameters in the model almost always improves the goodness of the fit [Good and Hardin 2006].
Further, we focus on coe cients and their statistical significance. These coe cients help us un-
derstand each feature’s relative influence on the optimal policy. We employ share among themselves
as the reference category for all models.
Linear regression models use the general linear equation Y = b0+
P
biXi, where Y is a continuous
response variable and bi is the coe cient of predictor Xi. However, in logistic regression models,
the coe cients are expressed in log-odds units. The coe cients show the e↵ect of a predictor on
the log odds of the optimal policy being in a given category (Y = 1) versus being in the reference
category (Y = 0); that is, the odds of Y being a given category increase by a factor of ebi per unit
change in Xi. The equation used by the logistic models is
P(Y = 1) =
1
1 + e b0 
P
biXi
(2)
We employ dummy variables for categorical predictors (e.g., relationship types). In these cases,
the reference category is the one that is missing in the table reporting the coe cients of each model.
Since we consider several hypotheses in each model, the probability of a Type I error (false
positive) is high. To reduce these errors, we apply the Holm-Bonferroni correction [Holm 1979]
during the evaluation of the statistical significance of the coe cients yielded by the models.
We include all the features of a type (contextual factors, preferences, and arguments), when pos-
sible. However, some features of the same type can be highly correlated, causing multicollinearity
[Gujarati and Porter 2009]. In that case, the coe cients may change erratically in response to small
changes in the data. To counter this e↵ect, we create independent models for highly correlated pre-
dictors. Note that this correction usually leads to higher coe cients.
Further, since each participant responded to a subset of scenarios (five out of 2,160), the per-
sonal privacy attitudes of participants may a↵ect the estimated coe cients of the models. Thus, we
employ mixed modeling [Robinson 1991] to create the logistic regression models. Mixed models
o↵er the possibility of grouping samples of the data hierarchically. Specifically, we group responses
by participants by employing the participant ID as a random e↵ect. In this way, the participant ID
captures the variability introduced by personal privacy attitudes in the responses. Introducing the ID
enables us to obtain estimated coe cients for the other predictors (fixed e↵ects) in a way that is less
a↵ected by variability in the participants’ responses.
4.2.2. H-Prediction-⇤. To evaluate our hypotheses about prediction, we build a classification
model. We evaluate the prediction accuracy of these models via:
precision =
TP
TP + FP
,
recall =
TP
TP + FN
,
F1-measure = 2 ⇥ precision ⇥ recallprecision + recall , (3)
where TP, TN, FP, and FN refer to true and false positives and negatives. We implemented these
models using Weka [Hall et al. 2009]. We perform ten-fold cross-validation and cross-validated
paired t-test [Dietterich 1998] to test significance in di↵erences, when required.
We note that the data we collect contains sharing policies that are considered optimal from the
view points of third parties. Participants’ responses may have been di↵erent if they were personally
involved in the scenarios shown during the study. Nonetheless, the data and results obtained from
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the study are still useful to investigate what elements influence the optimal sharing policy and to
build an initial dataset to train the policy recommender shown in Figure 1. However, in practice, to
achieve a high prediction accuracy, this recommender would require adaptive capabilities to learn
user-specific privacy behavior and predict sharing policies accordingly.
4.2.3. H-Confidence-⇤. To evaluate our hypotheses about users’ confidence, we perform the
Kruskal-Wallis test [Hollander and Wolfe 1999] on self-reported data from the post-survey ques-
tionnaire. The Kruskal-Wallis test is a nonparametric extension of one-way ANOVA and it relaxes
the assumption that the populations underlying the samples compared are normally distributed. This
test compares medians to determine if all ratings come from the same distribution. If the Kruskal-
Wallis test determines that all the ratings do not come from the same distribution, we perform the
multiple comparisons test [Hochberg and Tamhane 1987] to determine which variables are signif-
icantly di↵erent. As before, since we test multiple hypotheses, we employ the Holm-Bonferroni
correction to reduce Type I errors.
5. RESULTS
In the following sections, we evaluate each of our hypotheses.
5.1. Context (H-Influence-Context)
Recall that we ask participants to identify the contextual factors for each picture shown to them.
Contextual factors based on participants’ responses are what we employ in all of our analyses. Fig-
ure 2 shows the distributions of the contextual variables computed from participants’ responses.
These distributions suggest that our picture surveys represent quite some variety in terms of rela-
tionship, sensitivity, and sentiment.
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Fig. 2. Distributions of context variables computed from MTurk participants’ responses
Table III shows the coe cients of the multinomial logistic regression models employing only
contextual factors as predictors. The table shows the coe cients we obtain for models of optimal
policies in three cases. Recall that in each case the participants provided the optimal sharing policy
by considering a di↵erent set of factors: Case 1, considering only the contextual factors; Case 2, con-
sidering contextual factors and preferences; and Case 3, considering contextual factors, preferences,
and arguments. The coe cients for each case are shown in two columns: one for the coe cients
of the optimal policy being share with all versus the reference category share among themselves,
and the other for the coe cients of the optimal policy being share with common friends versus the
reference category. We highlight statistically significant di↵erences at significance levels (↵) of 5%
and 1% with * and **, respectively. As mentioned before, where multiple hypotheses are tested, we
adjust the significance levels via the Holm-Bonferroni correction.
In models for all three cases, we find that sensitivity is a significantly influential factor. Specifi-
cally, in the first case, where only contextual factors are considered, the estimated coe cient  5.485
indicates that the probability of the optimal sharing policy being share with all compared to the prob-
ability of being share among themselves decreases e 5.485 times for each increase in the sensitivity
level of the picture, assuming everything else remains unchanged.
The results also indicate that the significance of the type of the relationship decreases noticeably
when preferences and arguments are considered (Cases 2 and 3). For example, in both Cases 2 and
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3, relationship = colleagues is not statistically significant on the relative probability of the optimal
policy being share with all versus share among themselves. Similarly, relationship = friends is not
significant for the optimal policy being share with common friends versus the reference category.
In addition, sentiment is not significant in any case.
Our intuition, based on these observations, is that, most of the times, users consider it appropriate
to share a highly sensitive picture only among the individuals involved in that picture.
Table III. Regression coefficients for contextual variables
Variable
Coe cients
Context (Case 1) Preferences (Case 2) Arguments (Case 3)
All Common All Common All Common
Sensitivity  5.485**  4.174**  2.045**  1.508**  1.707**  1.38**
Sentiment  0.415  0.424  0.352 0.057  0.193 0.048
Relationship = colleagues  0.525**  1.345**  0.355  0.457**  0.245  0.543**
Relationship = friends 1.162**  0.464** 0.507**  0.165 0.659**  0.154
AIC 2481.1 3411.5 2471.0 4456.0 2599.0 4425.2
Further, we observe that as participants consider preferences and arguments, the coe cients of the
contextual factors decrease and AIC increases. This indicates that, when users take preferences and
arguments into account, the contextual factors’ influence on the optimal sharing policy diminishes.
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Fig. 3. Importance (from the post-survey questionnaire) of context variables
To further analyze the contextual factors, we compare these results with self-reported data col-
lected in the post-survey questionnaire. In this way, we can observe if participants’ opinions are
consistent with the decisions they made in the picture survey. Figure 3 shows the boxplots for par-
ticipants’ importance ratings to each contextual factor. A diamond dot in the boxplot indicates the
mean. Each dot outside a box indicates an outlier.
From Table III and Figure 3, we observe that the regression model and self-reported values fol-
low a similar pattern: sensitivity is the most influential factor. However, an important distinction
between the two is that although relationship and sentiment have similar ratings in the post-survey
questionnaire, sentiment is not significantly influential in the regression model. Also, in the post-
survey questionnaire relationship and sentiment have high (median of 4) importance ratings. How-
ever, their low regression coe cients suggest that participants did not consider relationship and
sentiment quite as important as they reported in the post-survey questionnaire.
5.2. Preferences (H-Influence-Preferences)
The logistic models for the contextual factors suggest that employing preferences can influence
the final sharing decision. Table IV shows the coe cients for models employing preference-based
features. It shows only Case 2 (Preferences) and Case 3 (Arguments) since Case 1 (Context) does
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not include preferences. We note that preference counts are highly correlated: when one count in-
creases, the other two counts (naturally) decrease, causing multicollinearity. To counter this e↵ect,
we create independent models for the highly correlated predictors. Thus, the coe cient values for
the preference counts features are obtained from di↵erent regression models: each of these models
employs only one preference count as its predictor.
Table IV. Regression coefficients for preference features
Variable
Coe cients
Preferences Arguments
All Common All Common
# Share with all 1.32** 0.693** 1.374** 0.767**
# Share with common friends 0.136 1.029** 0.119 0.978**
# Share among themselves  1.296**  1.468**  1.322**  1.494**
Least restrictive policy = All 1.021** 0.013 1.197** 0.229
Most restrictive policy = Self  1.421**  2.461**  1.31**  2.304**
Majority policy = All 0.674**  0.452* 0.766**  0.538**
Majority policy = Common  0.174  0.195  0.054  0.253
Majority policy = Self  0.584*  1.07**  0.536  1.173**
AIC 2309.0 3849.2 2380.2 3820.1
First, we observe that the most restrictive policy has the most influence on the final policy, more
so than even the majority policy. Second, we observe that preference counts have, in almost ev-
ery case, a statistically significant influence on the final sharing policy. Third, the coe cients of
the preference-based features do not change much from Preferences to Arguments. This lack of
change indicates that preferences remain important even when both preferences and arguments are
considered.
5.3. Arguments (H-Influence-Arguments)
Table V shows the regression coe cients for the argument-based features. Just as the policy counts
are highly correlated, so are the argument counts. Thus, we use di↵erent models for those features.
Considering the absolute values of the coe cients (ignoring the sign), preferences supported
by exceptional and positive arguments have the highest influence in the optimal sharing policy. In
contrast, the arguments for negative consequences yield the lowest coe cients, suggesting that our
participants weighed the benefits of sharing more than the potential risks of sharing a picture.
However, it is worth noting that argument from bad consequences supporting self (share among
themselves) has the highest coe cient of all argument counts. This observation indicates that when
a user makes a strong case for not sharing a picture, the other users respect that preference. This
finding is consistent with those of Besmer and Lipford [2010] and Wisniewski et al. [2012].
5.4. Prediction (H-Prediction-Preferences and H-Prediction-Arguments)
The foregoing hypotheses concerned how various features influence a sharing policy. Now, we eval-
uate a predictive model that puts these features to use. Since our objective is to predict the actual
policy (all, common, or self ), we build a three-class classifier, which makes discrete predictions.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of sharing decisions opted by our participants in the entire dataset.
Although participants’ preferences were often conservative, we note that participants opted each
preference on multiple occasions. This indicates that all three options we provided were useful.
We build logistic regression classifiers for di↵erent feature sets using the Weka implementation
[Hall et al. 2009]. Table VI compares the precision, recall, and F1 scores of the classifiers for the
three cases. The size column in the table shows, for each class, the percentage of the actual (ground
truth) instances belonging to that class.
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Table V. Regression coefficients for argument features
Variable Coe cients
All Common
# Positive supporting all 1.883** 1.071**
# Positive supporting common 0.534** 1.475**
# Negative supporting common  0.214 1.149**
# Negative supporting self  2.713**  3.436**
# Exceptional supporting all 1.274** 0.727**
# Exceptional supporting self  1.066**  1.197**
Positive supporting least restrictive policy  1.612**  1.257**
Negative supporting least restrictive policy  1.728**  0.168**
Exceptional supporting least restrictive policy  1.334**  1.043**
Positive supporting most restrictive policy 1.806** 1.354**
Negative supporting most restrictive policy 1.082* 1.269**
Exceptional supporting most restrictive policy 1.532** 1.446**
Positive supporting majority policy 2.641** 1.728**
Negative supporting majority policy  0.111 0.671**
Exceptional supporting majority policy  2.385**  2.53**
AIC 2417.0 3975.6
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Fig. 4. Distributions of sharing decisions computed from MTurk participants’ responses
Table VI. Precision, recall, and F1 scores of logistic regression classi-
fiers for the three cases, considering all data instances
Precision Recall F1 Class Size
Context
0.539 0.379 0.445 all 26.5%
0.493 0.472 0.482 common 36.0%
0.588 0.736 0.654 self 37.5%
0.541 0.546 0.537 weighted mean –
Preferences
0.329 0.047 0.082 all 15.4%
0.606 0.622 0.614 common 40.8%
0.610 0.779 0.684 self 43.8%
0.565 0.602 0.563 weighted mean –
Arguments
0.347 0.122 0.180 all 16.1%
0.610 0.640 0.624 common 39.2%
0.646 0.769 0.702 self 44.7%
0.584 0.614 0.588 weighted mean –
Analyzing the results obtained by the classifier, we observe that the F1 measure increases (1) from
Context to Preferences: contextual features to contextual and preference-based feature (H-Predic-
tion-Preferences), and (2) from Preferences to Arguments: contextual and preference-based features
to contextual, preference-based and argument-based features (H-Prediction-Arguments). Further,
from a 10-fold cross-validated paired t-test [Dietterich 1998], we find that di↵erences in the F1
measures are significant (p < 0.01).
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5.5. Confidence (H-Confidence-Preferences and H-Confidence-Arguments)
We compare a user’s confidence in choosing an optimal sharing policy given information corre-
sponding to the three cases. Figure 5 shows the boxplots of the participants’ confidence ratings
collected from the post-survey questionnaire. Further, from the Kruskal-Wallis and multiple com-
parison tests, we find that the median (x˜) confidence rating for Preferences compared to Context, and
Arguments compared to Preferences is significantly (p < 0.01) larger. This suggests that augment-
ing the contextual factors with preferences and arguments increases a user’s confidence in choosing
an optimal sharing policy for a scenario.
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Fig. 5. Users’ confidence (from the post-survey questionnaire) in choosing the optimal policy for di↵erent cases
5.6. Analysis of Misclassified Instances
We investigate the data instances our prediction model (Section 5.4) misclassified to find out whether
some combinations of scenario-defining elements make the prediction of optimal sharing policy
di cult. Because manually identifying such combinations is nontrivial, since our prediction model
employs multiple features, we employ two automated techniques for this purpose.
First, we cluster the misclassified instances via the expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm
[Dempster et al. 1977]. Our intuition in clustering is that there can be multiple types of scenarios
that make prediction di cult. The EM algorithm yields six clusters. We observe that the distribution
of scenarios with di↵erent ground truth policies (all, common, and self ) is almost uniform across
the six clusters—none of the six cluster contains more than a 40% scenarios with a given optimal
sharing policy as ground truth. Thus, the scenarios in each cluster are not linked to a specific optimal
sharing policy (and so are our following observations about the clusters).
Next, to report the clusters visually, in a human-readable format, we build a decision tree with the
six clusters as decision targets. The decision tree yields nearly perfect accuracy (99.93%). Figure 6
shows the resulting decision tree, where each leaf represents a cluster and shows its name and size.
For brevity, we employ the following notation for representing the nonleaf nodes in the tree:
— #share[All |Common |Self ] represents the number of users expressing that specific sharing pref-
erence in a scenario. For instance, in a scenario, if two users prefer the picture to be shared with
common friends, #shareCommon equals 2.
— #arg[Positive|Negative|Exceptional], represents the number of users employing a given argument
to support their preferences.
— [most |least]RestrictivePolicy represents the most or least restrictive policy employed in a given
scenario. For example, in a scenario, if #shareAll = 2 and #shareCommon = 1, thenmostRestric-
tivePolicy = common.
— argTypeFor[MostRestrictive|LeastRestrictive|Majority]Policy represent the types of argument
employed in a given scenario to support the most restrictive, least restrictive, or majority pol-
icy, respectively.
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— sensitivity, sentiment, and relationship represent the values of these contextual factors employed
in a given scenario.
mostRestrictivePolicy
argTypeForMajorityPolicy argTypeForMajorityPolicy
#argPositive Cluster 6 (105) #argNegative leastRestrictivePolicy #argExceptional #shareSelf
positive
common self
exceptionalnegative positive exceptionalnegative
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<= 3 > 3
Fig. 6. A decision tree with the six clusters of misclassified scenarios as decision targets (leaf nodes; shaded).
Our objective in training the decision tree is to interpret the paths in the tree. Our intuition is that
the path from the root to a cluster-leaf in the tree describes the combinations of feature values that
lead to misclassifications corresponding to the cluster.
On the one hand, we observe that few nodes in the tree represent contextual factors. Specifically,
there are only two paths that contain sensitivity; further, the clusters corresponding to these two
paths represent only 16 scenarios. Their rarity suggests that combinations of contextual factors
defining a scenario have little e↵ect on whether the scenario is misclassified or not.
On the other hand, we observe that most nodes in the tree (including nodes at the top two lev-
els) are related to users’ preferences and arguments in a scenario. This suggests that preferences
and arguments can help explain several misclassified instances. By observing multiple paths in the
tree, we infer that misclassified scenarios often present some conflict in terms of preferences and
arguments. To understand this better, consider three leaf nodes representing Clusters 1, 2, and 3
(highlighted as bold in Figure 6), which account for the majority of misclassified instances (61.4%).
— In Cluster 1, the most restrictive policy is self, and the majority policy is either all or common
(since #shareSelf  1).
— In Cluster 2, the most restrictive policy is self and the least restrictive policy is all.
— In Cluster 3, a negative consequence argument supports the majority policy, whereas an excep-
tional case argument seems to support the minority policy.
In each of these clusters, a participant must resolve the conflict somehow to choose a final policy.
We conjecture that a participant’s choice of final policy for a scenario posing conflicts depends
on how the participant interprets and more importantly, prioritizes the preferences and arguments
involved. Further, since such prioritization is likely to be subjective, two participants may choose
di↵erent policies as optimal for the same scenario, which can eventually lead to misclassification.
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6. MUPPET: A TOOL FOR MULTIUSER PRIVACY DECISION ASSISTANCE
Despite achieving only moderate accuracy, our prediction model can be a valuable tool for deciding
sharing policies in multiuser scenarios. To illustrate this potential benefit, consider how one would
employ our model in practice. Imagine a tool, Muppet, for multiuser privacy decision assistance.
Step 1. Given a piece of information to be shared, the Muppet tool identifies users concerned with
the sharing of the information. In a simple use case, one of the users involved can manually tag
the information with identifiers for all the concerned users. However, this step (or parts of it) can
potentially be automated. For example, many picture editors automatically detect and tag faces
in a picture; if the information to be shared is a social media post, concerned users are often
mentioned (e.g., by including “@Alice”) within the post.
Step 2. Muppet identifies the context of the information. Again, one of the users involved with
the information can manually identify the context of the information. However, some contextual
information can be automatically identified. Specifically, (1) relationship information can be ob-
tained from an SNS provided users organize their connections on the SNS based on relationships,
and (2) several automated approaches exist for computing the sentiment for both text and pictures,
e.g., [You et al. 2015].
Step 3. Each relevant user specifies their preferred sharing policy for the information and provides
an argument supporting their preference. In our current model, a user must choose one of the
predefined sharing policies and argument types. For example, a user may choose the preferred
policy as all and the argument as exceptional case.
Step 4. Given the information above (context of the information, users’ preferences, and argument),
the Muppet tool recommends a sharing policy for the scenario. The concerned user may adopt
or disregard the recommendation. However, if the user’s final decision can be observed, Muppet
model can be retrained in an online fashion, e.g., as in Murukannaiah and Singh [2015].
Considering the di culty of collecting data from first parties, an initial training of our model can
be performed on a dataset synthesized from third parties choosing optimal sharing policies in a va-
riety of scenarios (such as the dataset we built from our MTurk study). A downside of this approach
is that such a dataset may not accurately reflect users’ sharing behavior in multiuser scenarios (since
third parties do not share information for real).
An advantage of training with a dataset of third-party views, though, is that the resulting model
would be functional o↵-the-shelf. As explained above, the privacy settings selected by the partici-
pants represent socially accepted information-flow norms. This is strengthened by the fact that there
was a consensus between participants on the optimal policy for a scenario in the majority of sce-
narios employed in our study (specifically, for 63% of the scenarios we employed, all participants
that rated a given scenario provided the same optimal sharing policy). Therefore, our model can
recommend sharing policies starting from the first piece of information a user wants to share via a
tool based on our model. Although the model may yield moderately accurate recommendations in
the beginning, we posit that its accuracy would increase if the training set is updated with first-party
data collected from groups of users, and the recommender retrained accordingly.
Personalizing Muppet
As shown in Table VI, a machine learned classifier that employs contextual features, preferences,
and arguments achieves a moderate accuracy. However, this classifier ignores the characteristics of
the users involved in a scenario. Since sharing norms may vary depending on individuals and groups,
we envision personalizing Muppet’s recommendations depending on characteristics of the specific
users involved in a multiuser scenario. We posit that such a recommender, which learns from and
adapts to users, would yield a higher accuracy than the classifier we presented in this paper.
As an initial investigation to understand the influence of personal features on the optimal sharing
policy in a multiuser scenario, we build a multinomial regression model employing demographic
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variables (collected in the presurvey) as predictors and the optimal sharing preference provided by
the participants as the response variable.
As shown in Table VII, the coe cients for most demographic variables are not statistically sig-
nificant. However, two main exceptions are gender and sharing experience. Specifically, women
are much more reluctant than men to share information openly once they consider the preferences
and arguments of the parties involved in the multiuser scenario. This indicates that, in many cases,
women dismiss the least restrictive policy proposed in the scenario. Next, the greater the sharing
experience a user has, the more inclined that user is to share openly. Based on these results, Muppet
can include heuristics to personalize recommendations. For example, Muppet may recommend a
more conservative policy for a scenario which involves a majority of women compared to a similar
scenario with a majority of men.
Table VII. Regression coefficients for demographic variables
Variable
Coe cients
Context (Case 1) Preferences (Case 2) Arguments (Case 3)
All Common All Common All Common
Gender = male 0.486** 0.064** 0.515** 0.121** 0.463** 0.137**
Gender = female 0.541 0.036  11.74**  0.463  11.53** 0.215
Age  0.101*  0.067  0.136**  0.026  0.121** 0.003
Education level  0.051  0.042 0.057  0.009 0.068  0.033
Socialmedia use frequency 0.142* 0.061 0.181* 0.055 0.195* 0.027
Sharing frequency  0.285*  0.121  0.309*  0.103  0.324*  0.061
Sharing experience 0.281** 0.246** 0.294** 0.288** 0.296** 0.273**
Conflict experience  0.068  0.102  0.029  0.172  0.031  0.118
AIC 6127.15 9087.8 5872.8 8493.28 5988.5 8549.93
7. DISCUSSION
Our results show that contextual factors, preferences, and arguments influence the optimal sharing
policy. However, we find a disparity between the importance ratings participants assigned to contex-
tual factors and how these factors actually influence the optimal policy. Participants considered that
the sentiment a picture conveys is an important element (rating 4 out of 5). However, according to
our regression model, the influence of sentiment on the optimal policy is not statistically significant.
Our regression and inference models show that arguments help in predicting the optimal policy.
Further, the majority of participants reported that they feel much more confident about what policy
to apply to a shared item if they know others’ arguments. These results indicate that approaches
based only on aggregating user preferences, e.g., [Thomas et al. 2010; Carminati and Ferrari 2011;
Hu et al. 2011] (as discussed below), may not be e↵ective. Our results show that users are willing
to accommodate others’ preferences if they know their reasons. Therefore, knowing the preferences
alone is not su cient to set a policy that is satisfactory for the majority of the users involved.
The inference model achieves the F1 score of 58.6% when trained with features based on contex-
tual factors, preferences, and arguments. Although the accuracy of our model is not high in absolute
terms, it performs noticeably better than what some naive inference models can achieve. Specif-
ically, (1) a random classifier that randomly chooses one of three sharing policies as the optimal
policy would yield a 33.3% accuracy, and (2) a majority-class classifier that always chooses the
policy corresponding to the majority-class as the optimal policy would yield a 44.6% accuracy (Ta-
ble VI). We are not aware of other models (that predict sharing policies in multiuser scenarios) with
which we can compare our model. Our model can serve as a baseline for future works on this topic.
Our analysis of the misclassified instances reflects the complexity of considerations that go into
argument evaluation. Our results suggest that arguments are crucial in helping participants conceive
the information-flow norms for a given context. However, as our analysis suggests, these norms may
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be subjective. That is, although some users may consider an information flow in a specific context
as a norm, others may consider the same flow in the same context as a privacy violation.
7.1. Threats to Validity
We identify two threats to validity of our findings. First, any study based on surveys is susceptible
to participant confusion. We mitigated this threat via explicit quality control measures commonly
used in MTurk studies, such as selecting workers based on number of previous tasks completed and
task success rate, and employing attention-check questions, as detailed in Section 3.1.4.
Second, to avoid the unreliability of self-reported attitudes, the well-known reluctance of partici-
pants to provide sensitive information, and the logistical challenges of finding participants in sets of
three friends, we employ scenarios in which users immerse themselves and provide their assessment
of the policies, preferences, and arguments under consideration. This is based on methodologies
known to work well in other domains, such as [Mancini et al. 2010], as well as methodologies used
in other social media privacy studies, such as [Hart et al. 2009; Klemperer et al. 2012; Squicciarini
et al. 2011; Wiese et al. 2011]. Generalizations, however, should be made with caution, as partici-
pant’s decisions in such immersive scenarios may not necessarily match those in real scenarios.
7.2. Limitations and Directions
We identify a number of directions for future work. For logistical reasons, we employ prede-
fined types of arguments, preferences, and contexts. Thus, our findings are specific to these val-
ues. Nonetheless, other relationship types, sharing preferences, and argumentation schemes can be
appropriate or even desirable in a multiuser scenario. A future study could attempt to understand
what arguments users would employ to support their preferences during a multiuser scenario—the
prospective benefit being to discover argumentation schemes geared to multiuser sharing. Auto-
mated techniques for identifying arguments [Lippi and Torroni 2016] can be valuable in this regard.
Similarly, the influence of other elements suggested in the literature on the optimal policy is wor-
thy of investigation. For example, Nissenbaum [2004] identifies entitlement as a context-defining
factor. In SNSs, users may consider that the owner of the information item is more entitled than
anyone else to define the final sharing policy for that item.
We restrict the number of sharing policies to three options (share with all, common, themselves)
so as to limit the possible scenarios to a manageable number in our user study. Therefore, another
path for future research is to investigate how users solve privacy conflicts when fine-grained sharing
preferences are used. Additionally, researchers should look into whether modifying the potential
viewers can help users reach a satisfactory agreement. For example, a user who cannot be persuaded
through arguments to share a picture with common friends may waive her objection if the other
parties agree to exclude a specific common friend from the target audience.
In our study design, to limit the complexity of the multiuser scenarios, we restricted the nego-
tiation among the parties to one round. Wisniewski et al. [2012] and Besmer and Lipford [2010]
identify several social aspects that people employ to figure out an optimal sharing policy (e.g., trust
and group norms). A future direction is to incorporate such social aspects in the model presented
in this paper to determine how they evolve during successive rounds of a negotiation. For example,
arguments can change from round to round depending upon the preferences expressed by others.
And, group norms can dictate what arguments can be employed in a negotiation.
Our work contributes by informing the development of decision-support systems for multiuser
scenarios by modeling context, preferences and arguments to find an optimal sharing policy. How-
ever, additional challenges need to be addressed in order to develop a usable user interface for any
such decision-support system, such as finding an adequate trade-o↵ between user intervention and
automation to avoid burdening users. To this aim, suitable defaults, e.g., [Watson et al. 2015], or rec-
ommender systems based on machine-learning approaches, e.g., [Fang and LeFevre 2010], could
be applied. As future work, we plan on building a recommender tool and evaluating it with users,
so as to collect information about its accuracy and usability.
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A user may employ a multiuser decision-support system such as Muppet frequently. For example,
sharing group photos may be a daily routine for a user. Therefore, automating the process to a good
extent is an important consideration. To this end, we alluded to automated techniques for recog-
nizing sensitivity (e.g., [Peddinti et al. 2014]), sentiment (e.g., [You et al. 2015]), and relationships
(e.g., [Murukannaiah and Singh 2012; Fogue´s et al. 2014]). However, this is still an active research
area. Thus, a key challenge for future work on multiuser decision-support systems is evaluating not
only the recommendations of such such systems but also the automated techniques they build on.
In training and evaluating our policy recommender, we consider overshares (e.g, recommending
share with all when the optimal is share with common) and undershares (e.g., recommending share
among themselves when the optimal is share with common) as equally bad. However, in practice,
recommending a conservative sharing policy may be less harmful than recommending a liberal
policy when there is doubt on the optimal. Thus, a direction for future work is to consider cost-
sensitive models that would weigh overshares and undershares di↵erently.
The findings presented in this paper can be employed in a number of ways. The logistic regres-
sion models show how elements of context, preferences, and arguments influence information-flow
norms that dictate sharing decisions in multiuser scenarios. Therefore, formal models of norms,
e.g., [Barth et al. 2006], [Singh 2013], and [Criado and Such 2016], can be adapted for multiuser
scenarios by including those elements. Also, the reported accuracy of our classifier can serve as a
benchmark for future classifiers.
Our study is cross-sectional (one time) and in the scenarios of the study, decisions are to be made
in one round. Thus, our study does not provide data to understand how users deal with situations
where their arguments are countered by others’ arguments.
Finally, each participant in our study responded to five scenarios. Although we employed random
e↵ects in building the logistic regression models, personal privacy attitudes may bias the results. A
future study could require participants to engage in negotiation and persuasion to decide an optimal
sharing policy for a scenario. Such a study requires coordinating multiple participants; thus, con-
ducting such a study on MTurk is nontrivial. Employing automated agents (built based on the data
we collected in our study) against one or a few real participants is a viable and interesting direction.
8. RELATED WORK
As Wisniewski et al. [2012] identify, the lack of tools to manage multiuser scenarios forces SNS
users to employ a number of coping strategies, which are of limited e↵ectiveness in practice. Such
strategies include blocking other users, filtering friendship requests by the number of common
friends, and self censorship. In a similar previous study, Lampinen et al. [2011] explore SNS-users’
perceptions of control over online disclosure through a series of interviews. The qualitative data
obtained in their study suggests that users manage interpersonal boundaries both individually and
collaboratively. Lampinen et al. further classify the strategies that SNS users employ to manage their
privacy into two super classes: preventive and corrective. Strategies in both classes can be accom-
plished through individual or collaborative means. For example, a collaborative preventive strategy
is asking for approval before disclosing content from those involved. These two studies show that
SNS users need functionalities to manage multiuser privacy. Our work is a stepping stone toward
o↵ering such functionality.
Besmer and Lipford [2010] propose a method where the owner of a picture in a multiuser scenario
is in charge of deciding the sharing policy and the other users involved can suggest privacy prefer-
ences. They developed a Facebook application that enables a user to send privacy suggestions to the
owner of a picture where that user appears. Besmer and Lipford show that the owners of pictures
usually entertain and accept suggestions from others when they decide sharing policies—which is
consistent with our findings. A shortcoming of their approach is that it is manual, i.e., the owner of
a picture must determine an optimal solution based on suggestions from others. Such manual e↵ort
may overload the owner of the picture.
Thomas et al. [2010] propose veto voting as a direct approach to manage multiuser sharing poli-
cies. That is, denying access takes precedence over granting access. Thus, if an individual wants to
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share some information with a given user, but another individual does not, the information is not
shared. Whereas this approach protects privacy, it may lead to utility loss. For example, suppose
Alice and Bob appear together in a picture. Bob initially opposes sharing the picture with Charlie
as he does not know him. However, if Alice tells him that Charlie is her friend and that everything
is OK, then Bob may accept sharing with Charlie. Had veto voting been applied, the picture would
have not been shared with Charlie, thereby missing, for example, a potential opportunity for Bob to
be friends with Charlie.
Other approaches too tackle multiuser privacy conflicts. However, they exhibit various limita-
tions, which we describe next. Some of these approaches require too much human intervention
during conflict resolution: Wishart et al. [2010] require users to solve the conflicts manually. Like-
wise, Squicciarini et al. [2009] requires users to resolve conflicts nearly manually by participating
in di cult-to-comprehend auctions with fake money to handle every possible conflict.
Approaches that provide automated support [Carminati and Ferrari 2011; Hu et al. 2011; Thomas
et al. 2010] help resolve multiuser conflicts, but they usually consider only one fixed way of ag-
gregating user preferences, without considering how users would compromise and the concessions
they might be willing to make in a specific situation. Hu et al. [2013] consider more than one way of
aggregating user preferences, but the user who uploads an item chooses the aggregation method to
be applied, which becomes a unilateral decision without considering any input from others. Clearly,
solutions that do not consider input from the other users involved may lead to solutions that are far
from what some users would be willing to accept. This may lead users to manually resolve conflicts
most of the time. Such and Criado [2014; 2016] provide an improvement over the fixed ways of
aggregating user preferences by automatically inferring the particular situation for the conflict and
applying the concessions that are known to happen during o✏ine negotiations in those situations
[Lampinen et al. 2011; Wisniewski et al. 2012]. Situations are modelled considering the individual
preferences of each user involved, the sensitivity of the content, and the relationships to the po-
tential audience. While this approach captures and adapts to known situations, it may not capture
opportunistic concessions or agreements that may arise in potentially unknown situations.
Some recent works propose game-theoretic mechanisms to tackle multiuser privacy conflicts.
They define negotiation protocols, which are a means of standardising the communication between
participants in the process of negotiating a solution to a multiuser privacy conflict by defining how
the participants can interact with each other. These protocols are then enacted by users themselves
manually [Hu et al. 2014] or automatically by software agents [Such and Rovatsos 2016] to ne-
gotiate an agreed sharing decision for a particular item. Participants can follow di↵erent strategies
when enacting the negotiation protocols, and these strategies are analysed using well-known game-
theoretic solution concepts such as the Nash equilibrium. However, such proposals may not work
well in practice since they assume users are perfectly rational and do not capture the social idiosyn-
crasies that users consider in real life [Lampinen et al. 2011; Wisniewski et al. 2012].
Ilia et al. [2015] present a mechanism to enforce fine-grained access control in pictures by blurring
the faces of the users depicted in the picture based on each users’ access control list. This approach
can limit the utility of sharing information. However, used in conjunction with a decision-support
mechanism based our findings, Ilia et al.’s approach could enforce access control di↵erently for
di↵erent users in case they cannot agree on a sharing policy.
Arguments are commonly used to resolve conflicts in other domains. Murukannaiah et al. [2015]
employ arguments in requirements engineering to resolve conflicts in stakeholders’ goals. Their
findings that arguments lead to consistent responses aligns with our observation. Williams and
Williamson [2006] incorporate arguments and Bayesian networks for breast cancer prognosis, where
they exploit arguments to develop an explanation for the prognosis. A similar application in the pri-
vacy domain is to explain to a user, via arguments, the consequences of a particular sharing decision.
9. CONCLUSIONS
Sharing all kinds of information on SNSs is routine for many people. Examples of such information
are a picture from the Christmas party and a tweet about your imminent trip with friends. The
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information shared often involves multiple users. When the privacy preferences of two or more
users do not align, they should be able to negotiate so as to balance privacy and utility for each
user. The related literature proposes methods based on aggregating privacy preferences. However,
aggregation does not capture how people align with others’ preferences. In contrast, we propose
employing arguments to support preferences. We present an inference model that employs sharing
context, and users’ preferences and arguments to predict an optimal sharing policy in a multiuser
scenario. We conduct a crowdsourcing study to train and test our model.
Via a series of multinomial logistic regression models, we show that all three feature types we
consider influence the optimal sharing policy in a multiuser scenario. We find that (1) among the
contextual variables, sensitivity has the highest influence on the optimal policy; (2) among prefer-
ence-based features, the most restrictive policy has the highest influence on the optimal policy and,
in particular, not the majority policy; and (3) users may value arguments for sharing more than ar-
guments for not sharing; however, if the argument for not sharing is an exceptional case argument,
users usually support not sharing.
By training an inference model for each feature type, we find that a model employing argument-
based features predicts optimal policy with higher accuracy than those not employing arguments.
Further, from self reported data, we find that introducing arguments increases a user’s confidence
in choosing the final sharing policy. Further, we investigate the data instances our prediction model
misclassified to find out whether some combinations of scenario-defining elements make the pre-
diction of optimal sharing policy di cult. We find that conflicts between arguments and preferences
generate the majority of misclassification. This indicates that users interpret and prioritize arguments
subjectively, which suggests that a tool that aims at helping users deal with multiuser conflicts must
be adaptive and learn from the user.
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A. PICTURE SURVEY SCENARIOS
Table VIII shows the 12 pictures we employ in the picture surveys (Section 3.1.2). For each picture,
the table provides a description, context, and arguments.
— The description includes the scenario in which the picture was taken and the people involved in
its sharing.
— The context includes relationship, sensitivity rating, and sentiment rating of the picture. Note that
the context was identified by MTurk participants who answered picture surveys corresponding to
the picture.
— The arguments are of types: positive consequence, negative consequence, and exceptional case.
Note that (1) each argument is employed along with a sharing policy, and (2) di↵erent combina-
tions of arguments are employed in each picture survey (examples in Table I).
Table VIII: A list of pictures we employ in the picture surveys
Picture
and Context
Relationship: Friends (92.2%)
Sensitivity rating: µ = 1.56 (  = 0.96)
Sentiment rating: µ = 1.77 (  = 1.46)
Description Tim, Ashley, and Jerry just graduated. Tim’s father took the picture above after
the graduation ceremony. Tim wants to upload the picture to his social media
account.
Arguments
Positive consequence argument. People we know will be happy to see that we
are finally done with college.
Negative consequence argument. Our gestures are not appropriate for a mo-
ment like this; people might think that we did not take our college time seri-
ously.
Exceptional case argument. This is not like any of our other pictures. It was our
graduation, which happens only once in our lifetimes.
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Picture
and Context
Relationship: Friends (98.3%)
Sensitivity rating: µ = 3.29 (  = 1.16)
Sentiment rating: µ = 3.82 (  = 1.11)
Description Three friends, Santosh, Arun, and Nitin, decided to perform some stunts on
a motorcycle. Unfortunately, while performing a stunt, Arun and Nitin had a
minor accident. Santosh took the picture below at that very moment. Santosh
wants to upload the picture to his social media account.
Arguments
Positive consequence argument. Fortunately, none of us got hurt. This picture
makes anyone who sees it laugh out loud.
Negative consequence argument. People looking at this picture may think that
we are reckless drivers, which is not true.
Exceptional case argument. Motorbike stunts are not something we do every-
day.
Picture
and Context
Relationship: Friends (96.5%)
Sensitivity rating: µ = 3.78 (  = 1.16)
Sentiment rating: µ = 2.99 (  = 1.26)
Description Three friends, Mark (the groom), Alex, and John, go on a boat in Ibiza during a
bachelor party. They get drunk and meet some girls. This is one of the pictures
Alex took during that party. Alex wants to upload the picture to his social media
account, the day after the party.
Arguments
Positive consequence argument. This was one of the best day of our lives; we
should share these good memories with others.
Negative consequence argument. There were some girls in the party; people
might understand things the wrong way.
Exceptional case argument. This is not like any of our other pictures. This was
Mark’s bachelor party!
Picture
and Context
Relationship: Friends (94.5%)
Sensitivity rating: µ = 4.11 (  = 1.13)
Sentiment rating: µ = 4.24 (  = 1.20)
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Description The picture above is from an end-of-semester party Vanessa (the girl wearing
dark shirt with the US flag on it) hosted. The party went wild and a neighbor
called the police. There was some tension after the police arrived and a few peo-
ple invited to the party were arrested. The picture also shows Vanessa’s friends
Natasha (the girl on the grass) and Jessica (the girl at the very left of the picture).
Vanessa and her friends felt that the police abused their authority. Vanessa wants
to upload the picture to her social media account, a few days after the incident.
Arguments
Positive consequence argument. Police arrested some of us in the party. This
picture shows that police abused their power and arrested some of us for a
silly reason.
Negative consequence argument. We do not deserve what happened and this
picture brings back those traumatic memories.
Exceptional case argument. This pictures reminds us of one of the wildest party
we have had.
Picture
and Context
Relationship: Family (97.7%)
Sensitivity rating: µ = 1.90 (  = 1.25)
Sentiment rating: µ = 2.01 (  = 1.61)
Description The Moore brothers and their parents, wives, and children took part in a pho-
toshoot. The following is the best picture from the photo shoot. Frank wants to
upload the picture to his social media account.
Arguments
Positive consequence argument. We took this picture so that our loved ones can
see it an remember us.
Negative consequence argument. Our children appear in this picture; what oth-
ers can do with this picture concerns me.
Exceptional case argument. This is not like any other picture; we hired a pho-
tographer to take it.
Picture
and Context
Relationship: Family (96.7%)
Sensitivity rating: µ = 2.52 (  = 1.28)
Sentiment rating: µ = 3.09 (  = 1.06)
Description Jerry (the grandfather dressed as Santa), Timmy (Jerry’s grandson), and April
(Jerry’s granddaughter) took a picture during Christmas night. Jerry wants to
upload the picture to his social media account.
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Arguments
Positive consequence argument. It was a lovely evening and this picture brings
back good memories.
Negative consequence argument. Poor Timmy got scared. I do not think it is
fair to Timmy to share a picture of him crying and scared of his grandpa.
Exceptional case argument. This was the first time Jerry and Timmy took a pic-
ture together.
Picture
and Context
Relationship: Family (95.3%)
Sensitivity rating: µ = 4.51 (  = 0.76)
Sentiment rating: µ = 2.45 (  = 1.35)
Description Dolores and Philip decide to have their baby, Rose, at home with the help of
Ann, who is Dolores’ sister and a doula. They took the picture below during the
labor. Philip wants to upload the picture to his social media account, a few days
after Rose was born.
Arguments
Positive consequence argument. This picture shows that Rose was born peace-
fully at our home surrounded by those who love us.
Negative consequence argument. The idea of giving birth at home was to be at
a private place surrounded by only the people we love.
Exceptional case argument. This is not like any other family picture; this shows
that Rose is coming to our lives.
Picture
and Context
Relationship: Family (96.5%)
Sensitivity rating: µ = 4.21 (  = 1.01)
Sentiment rating: µ = 3.93 (  = 1.16)
Description Mary, Sophia, and Charles attend their mother’s funeral. Another family mem-
ber takes some pictures and circulates them among the family members. Mary
wants to upload the picture to her social media account.
Arguments
Positive consequence argument. Many people knew our mother and loved her,
including our friends. When people see this picture they will remember her
and see that we all were there to say goodbye.
Negative consequence argument. This picture may appear highly inappropriate
to many people.
Exceptional case argument. This is not like any other picture, we were saying
goodbye to mom.
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Picture
and Context
Relationship: Colleagues (94.4%)
Sensitivity rating: µ = 1.77 (  = 1.10)
Sentiment rating: µ = 2.83 (  = 0.92)
Description Maria, Bonita, and Felipe, three junior employees in a company, attend a busi-
ness lunch in which they meet their seniors. One of the other employees took
the following picture and sent it to Maria. Maria wants to upload the picture to
her social media account.
Arguments
Positive consequence argument. This picture shows that we are making good
progress in our careers.
Negative consequence argument. This was a professional event and our seniors
might want to keep it private.
Exceptional case argument. This is an exceptional event since we attended a
professional party for the first time.
Picture
and Context
Relationship: Colleagues (86.7%)
Sensitivity rating: µ = 2.67 (  = 1.32)
Sentiment rating: µ = 2.69 (  = 1.24)
Description Aiko (C) took the picture above with her colleagues Ichiro and Katsu and, a
French volunteer at the tsunami relief center. Aiko wants to upload this picture
to her social media account.
Arguments
Positive consequence argument. The picture shows the di cult situation in
which the survivors live. Sharing this can encourage people to help.
Negative consequence argument. Tsunami was a disaster and our gestures are
not appropriate. People may get the wrong idea.
Exceptional case argument. This was one of the worst natural disasters.
Picture
and Context
Relationship: Colleagues (92.9%)
Sensitivity rating: µ = 3.26 (  = 1.41)
Sentiment rating: µ = 2.46 (  = 1.50)
Description Jerry, Laura, and Sabrina work together in a company. They were asked to attend
the Christmas party dressed. However, a guy in their company (the one in pink
dress) brought the whole dressing to a new level. They took the following picture
at the party. Jerry wants to upload the picture to his social media account, a few
days after the party.
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Arguments
Positive consequence argument. People think that I have a boring life because
I work at a boring place; this will prove them wrong.
Negative consequence argument. This is embarrassing; people will pick on us
because of this picture.
Exceptional case argument. This is an exceptional event since a Christmas
party happens only once a year.
Picture
and Context
Relationship: Colleagues (98.0%)
Sensitivity rating: µ = 3.52 (  = 1.26)
Sentiment rating: µ = 3.50 (  = 1.00)
Description The hospital where Bryan, Martin, and Sophia work has recently changed its
shift policy making shifts much longer. Doctors complain that these shifts leave
them exhausted. During one such long shifts, at 4am, Bryan takes a picture of his
two colleagues Martin and Sophia sleeping while they wait for another patient
to come to emergencies. Bryan wants to upload the picture to his social media
account, a few days after the picture was taken.
Arguments
Positive consequence argument. This new shift policy is too demanding. A pic-
ture like this can convince the management to change the policy.
Negative consequence argument. If people think that we sleep on our job, they
won’t trust the hospital.
Exceptional case argument. A doctor sleeping on a chair is exceptional.
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